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6.1  Introduction 
After more than seventeen years of debate, contemplation, and preparation, 
the government in Taiwan finally incorporated value-added taxation into the 
tax system on April 1,  1986, in a move toward the establishment of a complete 
value-added tax (VAT) system in Taiwan. 
The earliest reference to the adoption of  the VAT  can be traced back to a 
suggestion made by  the Tax  Reform Commission of  the Executive Yuan in 
1969. The proposed VAT,  to a large extent, was to be substituted for the exist- 
ing system of indirect taxes. It was to be a sales tax (the business tax) supple- 
mented by a tax to finance education, the stamp tax, and the commodity tax. 
The main reason the VAT  was not implemented in Taiwan was fear of the 
inflation that many countries have experienced after adopting a VAT.  The Tai- 
wan government, however, recognized that it needed to reform the indirect tax 
system because it was economically distortionary and socially inequitable. In 
1985, the Economic Reform Commission was established for a six-month pe- 
riod  under  the  Executive  Yuan  and  functioned  as  a  temporary  policy- 
consulting body. The implementation of  the VAT  was recommended by  the 
council and finally realized in 1986. 
The indirect taxation of  business enterprises, prior to the tax  reform of 
April 1986, consisted of a turnover tax on sales (the "old" business tax) by all 
business entities (corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietorships), and a 
stamp tax  on certain  activities that  required  the drawing up  of  contracts, 
deeds, documents, and/or monetary receipts. The stamp tax required that a 
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stamp be bought and affixed to the taxable articles. Both the business tax and 
the stamp tax were provincial (municipal) taxes. Revenues collected in Taipei 
and Kao-hsiung,  however,  were shared equally with the central government 
in accordance with the Central and Local Public Revenues and Expenditures 
Determination Law. Revenues from the business tax constituted  11.4% of to- 
tal tax revenues in fiscal year 1986, and the stamp tax accounted for 3.8% of 
total tax revenues during the same period. In the tax reform of 1986, the VAT 
was incorporated into the business tax. The reformed business tax’s contribu- 
tion to total tax revenues increased to 13.5% in  1987, while the stamp tax’s 
contribution decreased to 0.6%. 
The commodity tax is a national excise tax assessed on an ad valorem basis. 
Taxable commodities include tobacco, liquor, sugar, beverages, cosmetics, oil 
and gas, electric appliances, vehicles,  etc. Many commodities were exempt 
or had their rates reduced after the adoption of the VAT; therefore,  revenues 
from the commodity tax dropped from 12.3% of total tax revenues  in  fiscal 
year 1986 to 11.2% in 1987. 
The goals of the tax reform of 1986 were, first, to reduce the importance of 
the stamp tax and the commodity tax within the indirect tax system by reduc- 
ing either tax rates or tax base. Second, the new tax system subdivides the 
business  tax  (sales tax)  into two categories:  the ordinary  business category 
having a 5% VAT rate, and the special business category, mainly consisting of 
small entrepreneurial businesses, specialty restaurants and nightclubs, and fi- 
nancial institutions, to whom turnover tax rates of  1%, 15-25%,  and 5% are 
applied, respectively.  The administration emphasized that the reform was pri- 
marily aimed at alleviating the objectionable features of turnover taxation, and 
not at generating more tax revenues.2 
According  to the  administration, the  1986 tax  reform  is only the  initial 
stage of the VAT implementation process in Taiwan. The ultimate goal of the 
reform is to integrate the stamp tax and a majority of the items covered under 
the commodity tax into the sales tax system, i.e., into the VAT  system. The 
threats of revenue imbalance and of inflation were the main reason the govern- 
ment did not implement wide-ranging tax reform all at once. They hoped that 
the experience gained from the 1986 tax reform would be helpful in reaching 
the goal of establishing a complete VAT  system. Therefore, it is worthwhile 
to review the impact of  the 1986 tax reform from both theoretical and policy 
points of view. 
1.  As in most countries, the small entrepreneurial business is excluded from the VAT  system 
becuase of  concern over compliance costs. Furthermore, specialty restaurants and nightclubs are 
subject to a high turnover tax instead of  a VAT, mainly for the purpose of discouraging these types 
of  businesses. The VAT is not applied to financial institutions, since their original turnover tax 
rate is 5 percent. Taxing financial institutions using a 5 percent VAT rate would result in a loss of 
revenue. 
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6.2  Administration 
Entities subject to the business tax  are divided into two categories: i.e., 
ordinary businesses are subject to a uniform 5% VAT  rate, and special busi- 
nesses are subject to various turnover tax rates. In 1988, there were 865,000 
businesses in Taiwan; more than half  of  these (456,000) were classified as 
special businesses (99.3%  being small entrepreneurial businesses3) and were 
excluded from the VAT.  Business entities with average monthly sales of less 
than N.T. $200,000 (about U.S. $7,700) are considered small entrepreneurial 
businesses and pay a lump-sum tax to the tax authorities. Since bookkeeping 
is not required of small entrepreneurial businesses, the tax administration has 
had  difficulty identifying their actual income. In fact, the monthly sales of 
many of these small entrepreneurial businesses greatly exceed N.T. $200,000, 
although their average reported monthly taxable sales are only around N.T. 
$60,000, according to government statistics. The total monthly taxable sales 
of small entrepreneurial businesses constitute only 15.2%  of total sales in Tai- 
wan4  Thus, the small entrepreneurial business category is considered a tax 
shelter by  many taxpayers. It also gives businesses further incentive to stay 
small-to  reduce their tax burden. Since the adoption of the VAT,  small busi- 
nesses have been  entitled to declare 10% of  their total tax as a tax credit. 
However, small entrepreneurial businesses with actual monthly sales exceed- 
ing N.T.  $200,000 would rather underreport their income than receive the 
credit. In order to take full advantage of the tax credit, the businesses would 
have to reveal their actual income and lose their status as small entrepreneurial 
businesses. Therefore, the 10% tax credit is seldom used by  them. This di- 
lemma hinders the so-called built-in self-enforcement function of the VAT  by 
making impossible the matching of  tax credits of  small businesses with the 
payable tax of other businesses under the VAT  system. 
A problem in tax administration surfaced as a result of the uniform invoice 
system  established in  the  1960s. Because of  the  popularity  of  “artificial” 
bookkeeping, the tax authorities have required all businesses, except for small 
entrepreneurial businesses, to use uniform invoices that are issued by the tax 
administration. After a sale, the duplicate copy of the uniform invoice must 
be returned by the taxpayer to the administration so that the transaction can be 
recorded. There is, however, a well-established black market for uniform in- 
voices. Businesses can falsify expenses on their tax  form by  buying blank 
invoices and filling in any purchase amount, thereby reducing their income 
tax  liability.  Meanwhile, the owners of the businesses selling the blank  in- 
3. See “Annual Report of Data Processing Center of the Ministry of Finance, 1988” (in Chi- 
4. Data are estimated from Monthly Report of  Business Tax Resources in Taiwan Area, March 
nese), Table 26-  1. 
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voices close up shop and run away without ever having paid any income tax. 
Under the  VAT,  other incentives  lead businesses  to use  forged  invoices to 
reduce their tax liability by overreporting their deductible expenses; i.e., the 
practice of using forged invoices reduces not only their business income tax 
liability but also their business tax liability. In an attempt to close this loop- 
hole, the administration  has established a computerized cross-checking  sys- 
tem, which requires businesses to report their monthly sales as the sum of the 
amounts indicated on their copies of  the uniform invoices. The reported sales 
data together  with the tax identification numbers of both  the seller and the 
buyer are then matched by the computer,  against the data from the original 
copy of  the uniform invoice  submitted by  the buyer for tax deduction pur- 
poses. 
To  simplify the administrative  work, there are now two types of  uniform 
invoices. One is used in the sale of intermediate goods or services. A dupli- 
cate of  the invoice is sent to the Tax Administration,  and its data are entered 
into the computer data system. The original invoice is held by the buyer, and 
the other duplicate is held by the seller for its records. When the buyer applies 
for a credit, the sales data from the original invoice (held by the buyer) and 
the duplicate (submitted to the Tax Administration) corresponding to each sale 
of intermediate goods and services are cross-checked to verify the accuracy of 
the data. The other type of invoice, having only one duplicate, is used in the 
final  sale of  goods and services and is not  entered  into the computer data 
system, since the final buyer (the consumer) cannot claim this purchase as a 
tax credit. 
The computerization  of uniform invoices, however, is costly. First, the lo- 
cal tax administration  must key in the information on each invoice. This re- 
sults in very high labor costs. For example, Taipei hired  210 full-time em- 
ployees  to key  in  the invoice  information  in  1986-a  direct  result  of  the 
adoption of the VAT  in that year.  The average monthly number of invoices 
that were processed at that time was around 4.6  million. Recently, the number 
of computer key-in employees has increased to 336, and the average monthly 
number of processed  invoices is more than 8 milli~n.~  The second cost in- 
volves the matching of  data and the cross-checking of the invoices, done by 
the Data Processing  Center at the Ministry  of Finance. Table 6.1 shows the 
amount that  was budgeted  for the Data Processing  Center  from fiscal year 
1984 to fiscal year 1989. The data processing cost associated with the busi- 
ness tax has increased from N.T.  $1  million in fiscal year 1986 (July 1985 to 
June 1986) to N.T. $102 million in fiscal year 1987. In 1989, the business tax 
became the most expensive tax to administer, mainly because of  its high data 
processing cost.6 Computerization, meanwhile, significantly helped to reduce 
the size of  the black market for uniform  invoices-between  July  1986 and 
5. Data are provided by the Bureau of Tax Administration, Taipei City Government. 
6. It is interesting to note that, while the administrative cost of the business tax  increased in 
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Table 6.1  The Cost Incurred in Tax Administration  for Data Processing 
(N.T. $1,000) 
Total  Business  Business  Individual  Commodity  Other 
Fiscal Year  Cost  Tax  IncomeTax  IncomeTax  Tax  Taxes 
1984  254,050  9,840  3,778  182,120  913  57,399 
(July 1983-June  1984) 
1985  247,723  4,434  3,566  220,250  323  19,150 
(July 1984-June  1985) 
1986  373,025  1,025  36,534  305,640  350  29,476 
(July 1985-June  1986) 
1987  410,959  102,450  35,438  250,330  2,540  20,201 
(July 1986-June  1987) 
1988  417,662  104,121  36,016  254,413  2,581  20,531 
(July 1987-June  1988) 
1989  369,785  142,768  69,724  109,151  5,395  42,747 
(July 1988-June  1989) 
Source: Department of  Statistics (1989, table 132). 
June  1987, 224 firms were found guilty of  selling blank invoices; between 
March 1988 and February 1989, the number dropped to just 16.’ 
6.3  Revenue Impacts 
6.3.1  Revenue Redistribution among Regions 
The business tax is a provincial (and municipal) tax. Given the lack of local 
autonomy in Taiwan, however, the Business Tax Law, like all other laws, was 
legislated  at the central  government  level.  Business tax  reforms,  therefore, 
have  to be  initiated  at the central  government  level.  Local governments  in 
Taiwan have no choice but to accept changes in the tax system. Handling the 
VAT at the central government level is suitable, since tax payments from one 
jurisdiction can be taken as tax credits in other jurisdictions.  The adoption of 
the VAT,  therefore, changes the tax  base of  local governments  from gross 
sales to value added and redistributes business tax revenues. Table 6.2 sum- 
marizes the impacts of changes in revenue.  I found that business tax revenues 
collected in Taipei dropped from 48% of total business tax revenues in fiscal 
cost of the individual income tax declined substantially. This result could be explained either by  a 
crowding-out effect under the budget constraint of  the Data Processing Center or by  the fact that 
an increase in the administrative cost of  the business tax indirectly reduced the administration cost 
of income taxes. To prove the existence  of such effects, further empirical studies would be needed. 
These studies, however, are not needed to draw the above-mentioned conclusion, since changes 
in the administrative cost of the business tax after fiscal year 1986 are much higher; therefore, the 
1986 tax reform must have played a large role. 
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Table 6.2  Business Taxation Revenue Changes of the Different Jurisdictions in Taiwan 
(millions of N.T. dollars) 
Taipei  Kao-hsiung  Taiwan Province 
Business  Business  Business 
Business  Income  Business  Income  Business  Income 
Fiscal  Tax  Gross  Tax  Tax  Gross  Tax  Tax  Gross  Tax 
Year  Revenue  Sales  Revenue  Revenue  Sales  Revenue  Revenue  Sales  Revenue 
1983  12,306  2,234,812 
(48.7)  (48.2) 
1984  13,713  2,066,485 
(47.6)  (41.6) 
1985  14,687  2,199,284 
(47.9)  (41.3) 
1986  18,733  2,329,675 
(48.0)  (41.1) 
1987  27,042  2,763,777 
(43.5)  (40.5) 
1988  33,328  3,250,777 





















































































Source: Department of  Statistics (1984-89,  tables 59, 64, and  113) 
Nore: Numbers in parentheses indicate the percentage share of the total corresponding values 
"Fiscal  year starts on July  1 and ends on June 30 of the next year. 
year  1986 to 43.5% and 45.2% in fiscal years  1987 and  1988, the two years 
immediately following the introduction  of  the VAT;  these  figures are much 
lower than the average percentage that prevailed before 1986. During the same 
period, both reported gross sales and business income tax revenues in Taipei 
stayed practically at the same percentage, as shown in the table, even with the 
introduction of  tax reform. These figures imply that the decline of business 
tax revenue  in Taipei should not be attributed to declines in either sales or 
profits. 
One possible explanation for the relative decline of business tax revenue in 
Taipei is that commodities sold there are usually produced outside of the city. 
Therefore, the change in the tax base from gross sales (under the turnover tax) 
to value added increases the amount of tax credits that can be taken and results 
in a reduction of the tax base in Taipei, more so than in other areas in Taiwan. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note, as can be seen from table 6.2, that such 
a redistribution of revenue makes  Kao-hsiung,  instead  of  Taiwan province, 
the leading beneficiary of tax revenues from business tax reform. After fiscal 
year  1986, the shares of  business tax revenues of Kao-hsiung increased from 
8.6% to 12.0% and 11.0% in fiscal years 1987 and 1988. 
6.3.2  Total Revenue Changes 
Three factors affect the level of business tax revenues: the tax rate, the tax 
base, and tax compliance. The Business Tax Law lists thirty-one exempt cat- 143  Business Tax Reform in Taiwan 
egories of the sale of goods or services; however, the purchase of these goods 
cannot be used as a tax credit in the VAT system. Exempt items mainly  in- 
clude land; the inputs and outputs of agricultural production; medical services; 
textbooks  approved  by  government authorities;  newspapers;  goods and ser- 
vices  made  in  or  provided  by  prisons;  public-monopoly  goods;  postage 
stamps; fish  caught and  sold  by  fishers;  government-promoted  insurance, 
bonds,  and securities; military supplies; interest on the flow of funds among 
the head and branch offices of banks; gold; and research services provided by 
nonprofit organizations (art. 8). In addition, there is a zero-rate category. The 
purchase of goods in this category, however, may be used as a tax credit. The 
zero-rate category mainly includes exports, export transactions, and interna- 
tional transportation services (art. 7)  .* 
The tax authorities had expected that, with a 5% VAT rate, tax exemptions, 
and the zero-rate treatment mentioned above, the revised business tax system 
would generate the same level of tax revenue as before. It turns out, however, 
that they were a bit optimistic. Lin and Lin (1989) estimated the amount of 
revenue that would have been collected from the business tax, the stamp tax, 
and the commodity tax for the years 1986 and 1987, had the 1986 tax reform 
not been adopted. Their findings indicate that, although the business tax rev- 
enues increased significantly after the tax reform, when economic growth and 
the revenue losses of  the commodity tax, the stamp tax, and the education 
surcharge are taken into consideration, the new business tax did not collect as 
much revenue as the old one would have. The loss has been estimated at ap- 
proximately N.T. $1 1,444 million in fiscal year  1986 and N.T. $13,801 mil- 
lion in fiscal year 1987-about  20% of the total business tax revenue collected 
during those two years. 
The overestimation of the new business tax revenue by the tax authorities 
probably  was  a result  of  two factors.  One was pointed to by  Lin  and Lin 
(1989): the 5% VAT rate, which was supposed to generate a level of tax reve- 
nue equal to that before the tax reform, was too low. They furthermore sug- 
gested that, in order to maintain  the same revenue-generating  capacity,  the 
VAT rate should have been fixed at around 6.1% or 6.2% (42). 
Their suggestion, however, overlooks the other factor that plays a very im- 
portant role in revenue changes under tax reform, i.e., the change in tax com- 
plian~e.~  Before April  1986 the business tax liability incurred at the time of 
sale, under the turnover rate system, was included in the list price of the com- 
modities (tax-included pricing).  After the adoption of the VAT,  however, the 
government required that the list price be taxed, for the convenience of  calcu- 
lating the tax credit. This tax-excluded pricing policy has hindered the func- 
tioning of the uniform invoice system and has resulted in a high level of tax 
evasion. 
8. For details, see Public Finance Training Institute (1988, 16-17). 
9.  Lin and Lin (1989) did mention that better tax compliance is one method that could result in 
better collection of  the business tax. Their estimation,  however, indicates that changes in  tax 
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The uniform invoice system was established on the proviso that firms vol- 
untarily issue invoices at the time of  every sale. In fact, this has not happened. 
Firms tend to underreport sales by not issuing an invoice at the time of sale. 
As a result, the tax authorities have been trying to induce consumers to ask 
for invoices with every purchase. The most important device being used to 
induce this kind of behavior is the uniform-invoice lottery. Consumers have a 
chance to win N.T. $2 million just by obtaining  an  invoice at the time of 
purchase. 
Before  the  adoption  of  the  VAT,  under  a  tax-included  pricing  policy, 
whether invoices were issued or not, consumers paid one price, because the 
tax was already included in the sale price.  Because of the VAT  and because 
tax payments were now based on the list price of commodities, the tax shifted 
to those consumers who were issued invoices. Under this kind of tax-excluded 
pricing policy, consumers can pay a lower “price” for products, that is, they 
do not pay the tax if they do not ask for an invoice. If they request an invoice, 
they pay an amount equal to the noninvoice price plus the amount of the tax. 
Consumers, therefore, are discouraged from asking for an invoice. In short, 
under both pricing policies, firms end up receiving hidden income from sales 
if no invoices are issued (no revenues recorded) at the time of sale. Consumers 
and firms found it in their best interest to cooperate with each other to escape 
the business tax and the business income tax, respectively. 
In order to encourage consumers to demand invoices, the tax authorities 
finally decided to change the pricing rules that are applied to firms; the change 
requires that the list price of  final goods include the amount of  the business 
tax (tax-included pricing).  This was put into effect in July  1988, and as a 
result, tax revenues increased significantly starting in fiscal year 1989. Table 
6.3 summarizes the changes in the tax revenue of the various taxes before and 
after the tax reform. 
Column (3) of the table shows total annual business tax revenues before and 
after the introduction of tax reform. The integration into the business tax of 
the education surcharge and items covered formerly by the commodity tax and 
the stamp tax has increased the average business tax rate from 0.58 cents per 
dollar of sales in 1985 to 0.90 cents in 1986, as shown in column (4).  Column 
(10) indicates the revenue difference between the current business tax and that 
of the pre-1986 tax system. It is interesting to note that the tax-excluded pric- 
ing policy in effect between 1986 and 1988 seems to have been the main cause 
of the differences in revenues during the period. When the pricing policy was 
changed to include the amount of the business tax in fiscal year  1989, the 
revenue from the business tax increased by  about 25%,  as indicated in col- 
umn (1  1). Table 6.3  Comparison of Revenues between the “Old” and  the “New” Business Tax (millions of N.T. dollars) 
Revenue 
Taxable Sales  Average  Business  Estimated Tax Revenue without 1986’s Tax Reform  Difference 
Tax  Tax  Tax  Dollar  Business  Education  Stamp  Commodity  Revenue  “New” Tax 
Business  Tax per  (56) of 
Fiscal  Included  Excluded  Revenue  Sales  Tax  Surcharge  Tax  Tax  Total  Difference  Revenue 

























































0.9026  34,573  8,470  15,105  7,005  65,153  11,444  21.31 
0.9OoO  44,038  10,789  19,240  7,950  82,017  13,801  20.23 
0.8413  48,576  11,901  21,226  8,157  89,857  19,521  27.75 
1.0404  56,236  13,778  24,569  8,165  102,745  2,038  2.02 
Sources: Data for columns  1 and 3 are from the Department of Statisitcs (1984-89,  1990) 
Note:  Columns 2 and 4-1  1 are estimated using the method in Lin and Lin (1989). 
“4) = [(3)/(2)]/100. 
b(9) = (5) + (6) + (7) + (8). 
‘(10) = (9) -  (3). 
d(l  1) = [(10)/(3)]/100. 146  ChuanLin 
6.4  Economic Impacts 
6.4.1  Price Effects 
The economic impacts of  the 1986 tax reform are wide-ranging, and  it is 
hard to identify each of them individually. One beneficial effect often men- 
tioned by the supporters of the VAT  is encouragement of exports. To  analyze 
the effect is difficult, since the observation period is too short for empirical 
tests. Nevertheless, some impacts are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Before the adoption of  the VAT,  inflation caused by  tax  changes was  an 
issue of debate within Taiwan society. Projections on the price effects resulting 
from tax reform were made using input-output analysis-widely  practiced at 
that time by many researchers such as Lin (1984) and Lin (1986). They con- 
cluded that there would be a mild price increase with the adoption of the VAT 
in Taiwan. In fact, the adoption of the VAT  in 1986 has not brought on infla- 
tion; the consumer price index and the wholesale price index dropped in the 
months immediately following the implementation of tax reform. 
The stability of  the price level, given the adoption of  the VAT,  could be 
attributed to the following facts: 
1. Persistent wholesale-price decline since  1982 is believed to be  closely 
related to relatively low economic growth in  Taiwan  and the decline in the 
price of  energy on the international market. Inflation expectations in  1986, 
therefore, were very weak. 
2. The government took several preventive measures to stabilize the price 
level, including the reduction or elimination of  the tariff  rates on more than 
eight hundred imported items in February  1986; the abolition of  valuation 
provisions that required a 5% increase in the value of imported goods above 
the CIF value of imports for tax purposes; the reduction in the price of public 
utility services, especially of  petroleum products and electricity, before and 
after the introduction of  the VAT;  zero-rating public businesses and enter- 
prises such as the Taiwan Fertilizer Company, Taiwan Sugar Corporation, Tai- 
wan Salt Works, China Steel Corporation, and the Taiwan Railway Adminis- 
tration, which would have borne an extra tax burden as a result of the adoption 
of the VAT.  lo 
3. The government chose 151 commodities including items of food, cloth- 
ing, housing, transportation, communications, medicine, and education, cal- 
culated their “rational” prices, and then informed the general public so that 
businesses would have to reset their retail prices. In addition, the government 
oversaw the price changes in department stores, supermarkets, and restaurants 
to be sure that there was no “irrational” pricing of goods, i.e., to be sure that 
the reduction in prices was passed on to the consumer. Business entities refus- 
ing to cooperate with the government took the risk of being boycotted as a 
10. For details, see Public Finance Training Institute (1988, 8-9). 147  Business Tax Reform in Taiwan 
result of mass-media coverage or of being harassed by the tax authorities and 
having their tax returns audited by the tax bureau. 
4. The introduction of the 5% VAT rate, which replaced the old tax system 
for many businesses, did not result in any significant change in the business 
cost of production. 
6.4.2  Distribution 
It has become controversial  as to which consumption items should be ex- 
empt from the VAT and which items should be subject to the higher turnover 
tax rates. The controversy arises mainly from concern over income distribu- 
tion and social equity. Like all sales taxes (business taxes), Taiwan’s is also 
regressive (Davies 1959, 70)-the  average propensity to consume declines as 
income rises. The regressivity of the tax, however, can be reduced through the 
use of tax exemptions or multiple tax rates on various consumption items with 
different income elasticities. To determine the degree of regressivity of  the 
business tax, therefore, an empirical analysis of the income elasticities of  var- 
ious final goods and services is needed. 
My empirical analysis of business tax regressivity in Taiwan was conducted 
with two sets of cross-sectional data on household expenditures and income: 
the entire sample composed off 3,881 households and the random subset, 515 
households.  The data on households were taken from a survey conducted by 
the Directorate-General  of the Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, Executive 
Yuan, 1986. A random sample of 500 was deemed sufficient for the regression 
analysis. The data on the 3,881 households were further divided into twenty- 
four income brackets. The year,  1986, was selected because it is the year tax 
reform was introduced in Taiwan.  Finally, all the variables in the regression 
analysis were transformed into logarithms, so that the estimated income elas- 
ticity of each tax base could be regarded as a regressivity (or progressivity) 
index. 
The Schaefer (1969) model  was used  to estimate  the  regressivity  of  the 
business tax. Since comprehensive income data were not readily available, I 
used the best approximations that could be obtained from the available infor- 
mation. Total monetary  income was employed; it is assumed to be  a good 
measure of ability to pay taxes. The model is succinctly delineated as follows: 
n 
2  w,  log  i,, = log a, + b, 2  w,  log y,  + C w,  log e,,,  ,=  1  ,=I 
(1) 
where i,, = mean ith business tax base for thejth income group, y,  = mean 
income for thejth income group, b, = progressivity index for the ith business 
tax base, a, = a constant, el, = error term for the ith business tax base for 
the jth income group,  and w,  = the  population  weight  of  the jth income 
group. The regressivity or progressivity of the business tax depends on its tax 
coefficient, b,. If the income elasticity of the ith tax base is unitary (6, = l), 
this implies that the effective tax rate remains constant as income increases, 148  ChuanLin 
so that the business tax  is considered proportional. If  b, < 1, the tax rate 
decreases as income increases; the tax  is considered regressive. Similarly, if 
bi > 1, the tax rate increases as income increases, and the tax is considered 
progressive. 
All  estimates reported in  table  6.4 were obtained by  the ordinary  least 
squares estimation method, which assumes a constant variance in  the error 
terms among income groups. According to the criteria described earlier, it is 
apparent that business taxes on most items are regressive except for the taxes 
on recreation and education, as well as those on financial services, which are 
progressive. Most of  the coefficients are statistically significant at the  1% 
level. 
Using the average data from the complete sample site of  3,881 households, 
the business tax on financial services is the most progressive, and the business 
tax  on recreation and education is proportional or slightly progressive. The 
results change moderately when  the data of  the randomly selected subset of 
515 households are used. It should be noted that, while the tax on financial 
services was progressive for the complete set of  data, it was found to be re- 
gressive for the subset data. 
Table 6.4  Progressivity Indexes for Various Business Tax Bases, Using 
Aggregate and Disaggregate Data 
Business Tax Base  3881  Random Sample 
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Nures: Standard errors are in parentheses. All variables are in log form. 
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Since the business tax on food and on medicine is highly regressive regard- 
less of the data type, one can expect that the exemption of these items from 
taxation might reduce the regressivity or increase the progressivity of the busi- 
ness tax. The bottom row  in  table 6.4 shows that both food and medicine 
exemptions improve the progressivity index from 0.666 to 0.838 when using 
the complete set of data. To test the robustness of the result, the smaller data 
set was used to measure the impact of these exemptions. A very similar result 
was found-the  progressivity index increased from 0.668 to 0.863. 
Tax exemptions on agricultural products and medical services have been in 
effect since the revision of  the 1986 Business Tax Law that came along with 
the adoption of the VAT.  However, financial organizations are subject to a 5% 
turnover tax.  The tax  also may  not  be  credited. Based  on my  estimation, 
therefore, I conclude that the current business tax, which includes the VAT, 
has improved the progressivity of the tax system-the  result of tax reform. In 
order to further improve the progressivity of the business tax, the tax authori- 
ties in Taiwan might need to grant more exemptions on the sale of food items 
and on utility expenditures. Furthermore, since the introduction of the VAT  in 
1986 is considered only one step of the indirect tax reform in Taiwan, changes 
on other indirect taxes, such as the commodity tax, the stamp tax, and even 
the monopoly profits from tobacco and wine, could be involved in future tax 
reforms. Therefore, the results found in table 6.4 provide information on how 
to improve the progressivity of the indirect tax system. 
6.5  The Importance of the 1986 Tax Reform 
According to the government, the introduction of the VAT  in  1986 empha- 
sized not the generation of  more tax revenues but improvements in the eco- 
nomic efficiency and social equity of the tax system. It is puzzling, however, 
that the government has not yet made any effort to evaluate or improve the tax 
system with a view either to economic efficiency or social equity since the 
adoption of the VAT.  The Business Tax Law was revised in May  1988 to pro- 
vide for more tax exemptions, mainly for convenience of tax administration. 
There are no data available with which to empirically investigate the impacts 
of the tax reform on investment or international trade. 
Nevertheless, the 1986 business tax reform could be considered an impor- 
tant building block for other tax reforms in Taiwan in the future. As a result 
of tax exemptions and widespread tax evasion, income taxation in Taiwan has 
played a very limited role in the generation of government revenue, in com- 
parison to other countries. Currently, high income tax  rates are applied to 
relatively narrow tax bases. For example, in  1988, there were 4.65 million 
households in Taiwan, but only 2.66 million filed individual income tax re- 
ports and paid taxes. Among these, only  1,919 households’ adjusted gross 
income was reported to be in the highest income bracket (income above N.T. 
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The aggregate adjusted gross income of all taxpayers constituted only 33.32% 
of total national income. As for the business income tax, there were 834,416 
business entities in Taiwan in 1987. Even with an effective business income 
tax rate of around 25%,"  the average business income tax payment for each 
business entity was only N.T.  $63,798 (about U.S. $2,300) for  1987. The 
seriousness of income tax evasion implies that income tax reforms that reduce 
tax rates are needed to expand the tax base. In fact, tax rate reduction has 
already taken place; the government revised the Income Tax Laws in 1990. As 
a result, there might be more losses in tax revenue. 
In  addition to income taxes, commodity taxes at relatively high rates are 
being levied on a few selected items and have been regarded as very distor- 
tionary. One of the reasons for the adoption of the VAT  was to curtail the rise 
in the commodity tax rates. The revenue lost as a result of the 1990 income 
tax reform, therefore, should not be made up by increasing the commodity tax 
rates. Furthermore, revenues from custom duties declined dramatically from 
17.2% of  total tax revenues in  1986 to  11.8% in  1989 as a result of  recent 
U. S. political pressure demanding tariff  reductions. The Taiwan government 
must find a way to compensate for the revenue losses due to the income tax 
rate, tariff rate reductions, and abolition of some commodity taxes. One viable 
way  to do this is to raise the business tax rates, since the VAT  in Taiwan is 
only 5%, which is lower than the rates adopted by other countries. Currently, 
the business tax generates approximately 14% of total tax revenue at all levels 
of  government, which is higher than either the business income tax (12.3%) 
or the individual income tax (1 1.9%). The shifting of the major source of tax 
revenue from income taxes to the business tax would further encourage busi- 
ness entities to honestly report their sales revenues, since sales taxes are easier 
to shift onto consumers than income taxes are. This would improve the tax 
evasion problem, not only in  income taxation but also in business tax, and 
would generate more revenue. 
6.6  Conclusion 
Before the 1986 tax reform, the tax system and tax structure in Taiwan, as 
in most developing countries, were poor. Income taxes were constantly being 
evaded, and high tax rates could not generate very much tax revenue. The 
main revenue sources were tariffs, commodity taxes, and business taxes (sales 
taxes). High tariff rates hindered international trade, the high rates of the com- 
modity tax distorted resource allocation, and the business tax that used turn- 
over rates was considered the worst type of  sales tax in the world (Due and 
Friedlaender 1981, 414-16).  The introduction of  the VAT  in  1986 was  the 
11. There is a  15% tax rate applied to business entities with an  initial income less than N.T. 
$1OO,OOO.  There is also a tax ceiling for qualified businesses under the Statute for Encouragement 
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first step in reforming the indirect tax system in Taiwan and was, therefore, 
very important. 
Unlike the experiences of Japan and the United States, the introduction of 
the VAT  in Taiwan did not encounter too much resistance from the public. 
This is because the VAT was introduced not as a new tax but as a replacement 
for the business  tax  based  on turnover  rates,  which  had  been  widely  con- 
demned by the public  in Taiwan.  Since the VAT rate was very  low and the 
government  promised  the public  that total tax revenues would  not  increase 
under the tax reform, the impacts of the VAT were accepted by the public. In 
fact, the government successfully stabilized price levels and improved the dis- 
tributional function of the business tax under the tax reform. After a trial-and- 
error process,  the government further avoided possible  loss of  revenue by 
changing  the pricing  policy,  from one of  tax-excluded  to tax-included,  for 
business entities. 
Some problems remain, however. One is that the business tax is a local tax, 
and economic development and democratization will sooner or later give rise 
to demands for decentralization  and  local  autonomy  in  Taiwan.  Once this 
comes to pass, decisions concerning the tax rate or the tax base of the business 
tax will be made by the provincial or municipal governments. Operating the 
VAT  system would become infeasible.  Swapping the business tax at the pro- 
vincial (and municipal)  level for a national tax, therefore,  was necessary. A 
tax-sharing or intergovernment-grant system is further needed in order to keep 
the level of revenue of the provincial and municipal governments the same. 
The second difficulty is how to reduce the increasing administration costs 
of keying in each piece of data from the uniform invoices. The uniform in- 
voice system cannot effectively eliminate the people’s widespread evasion of 
the income and business taxes, and it results in an enormous administrative 
burden  on both the tax  administration  and the taxpayers.  In  fact, business 
entities have the incentive not to issue an invoice at the time of sale, since they 
would prefer to escape their business income tax liability even more than their 
business tax liability: although neither tax would be paid if invoices are not 
issued, the business tax is easier to shift to consumers. Reducing the business 
income tax liability, therefore, would reduce the incentive for business entities 
not to issue invoices. Besides, given the predominance of small entrepreneurs 
in Taiwan, it is difficult for the tax  administration to trace those who evade 
payment of business income tax and to collect the income tax. A more realis- 
tic solution, therefore, would be to reduce the current income tax rate (and tax 
liability). This would help eliminate the widespread problem of  tax evasion. 
To reduce the business income tax liability, another tax reform is necessary, 
involving the integration of the income taxes (the business income tax and the 
individual income tax) or lowering the income tax rate to expand the tax base. 
Income tax reform together with a further reduction in commodity tax rates 
and custom duties definitely would reduce tax revenues.  On the other hand, 
the VAT tax rate could be increased, thereby increasing tax revenue; the in- 152  ChuanLin 
creased revenue could then be used to reduce other taxes. The prerequisite of 
such an arrangement  would be to enlarge the VAT  system and diminish the 
size of the small entrepreneur category. 
Finally, the tax authorities might need to give tax exemption status to sev- 
eral  new  food  and  unprocessed  agricultural  products  categories  and  to all 
medicines, in order to improve tax regressivity. This would guarantee that the 
shifting of tax burden from income taxes to the business tax would not hurt 
social justice or equity. 
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COmment  Ching-huei Chang 
In this paper Chuan Lin attempts to evaluate the recent business tax reform in 
Taiwan. In 1986 the old system of multistage turnover tax was replaced by the 
value-added  tax, which imposes a flat rate of 5 percent on almost all goods 
and services sold except those subject to the commodity tax. The tax reform 
is considered by Taiwan’s government to be a great success in the sense that 
the new business tax has brought in more revenue each year than the old one. 
Also, the general price level, which it was thought might be pushed up by the 
tax substitution, turned out to be quite stable after reform. The experience in 
Ching-huei Chang is a research fellow of Sun Yat-sen Institute for Social Sciences and Philos- 
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Taiwan has attracted the attention of  some Southeast Asian countries, which 
are also interested in adopting the VAT. 
However, Lin is not so optimistic about Taiwan’s result. He argues that the 
introduction of the VAT has increased administrative costs and does not solve 
some serious problems that arise mainly from preferential treatment of small 
firms. In fact, the VAT aggravates the difficulty by its use of the uniform in- 
voice. He also points out that the VAT  in fact does not produce substantially 
more tax revenues than would be produced under the old system of turnover 
tax. Judging from the equity goal of taxation, the VAT  in Taiwan is found to 
be regressive; the tax burden on the poor may be higher than that on the rich. 
In view of the defects of the current VAT system, Lin suggests that consump- 
tion of food and other necessities should be exempt from taxation. The loss in 
tax revenue could be compensated by raising the current rate form 5 percent 
to 6 percent. He expects that in this way the VAT can be made less regressive 
and the amount of tax revenue can be maintained or even increased. 
I agree with most of Lin’s points, but I have some general observations to 
make. First, when measuring the revenue impact of this tax reform, Lin com- 
pares the amount of revenue the VAT generates with what the old turnover tax 
might have produced. When measuring the effect on administrative cost, how- 
ever, he does not make such a comparison. Thus, the case may be that, even 
without the tax reform in 1986, administrative costs would have increased to 
the level shown in table 6.1 or even higher. In other words, the increase in the 
costs should not be attributed solely to the new business tax. Table 6.1 also 
shows that, although the cost of  administration for business tax increased in 
1987, the cost for business income tax fell moderately and that for individual 
income tax fell substantially. Is this just a coincidence or does a negative cor- 
relation exist between the two? Further empirical studies must be done. 
Second, at least in theory, one of the major arguments in favor of the VAT 
is that a uniform VAT rate applied to a wide range of goods and services would 
correct the serious distortions associated with the old turnover tax. However, 
the tax  alone may  work against distributional objectives,  since it is proved 
that the tax burden is regressive. Thus, as is often suggested, this tax should 
be supplemented by the commodity tax, which is in essence an excise tax and 
imposes differential rates on certain luxury goods. In this way the indirect tax 
system, rather than the business tax alone, can take care of both efficiency and 
equity goals. If this argument of the “policy mix” is accepted, I think an ap- 
propriate approach to evaluating the impact on income distribution is to mea- 
sure the combined effect of  business tax, commodity tax, and possibly mo- 
nopoly revenue, which in a sense is also an excise tax. 
Third, another consideration of introducing the VAT  into Taiwan was its 
beneficial effect on export. No further elaboration is needed because the ar- 
gument is quite straightforward. But an empirical estimation must be done of 
how much of the recent trade expansion in Taiwan can be attributed to the tax 
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Comment  Kwang Choi 
The paper  by  Chuan  Lin  provides  an excellent appraisal  of business taxes 
(value-added tax) reform in Taiwan. Though short, the paper covers all impor- 
tant  issues raised  in  the  introduction  of  the  VAT,  including administrative 
problems, revenue impacts, price effects, and distributive implications. 
I have little to say in criticism of the paper itself. Though this is not a good 
place to raise theoretical questions of a general nature, I would like to ask the 
rather fundamental question of whether the VAT is a consumption tax (borne 
by consumers) or an income tax (borne by owners of businesses). I would like 
to point out that, in almost all writings on the VAT,  authors have been apply- 
ing  double  standards  on  the  incidence of  the  VAT  or on  who  really  pays 
the VAT. 
On one hand, when we talk about the regressivity  of  the VAT,  we always 
assume that the tax is shifted to consumers and that the burden is borne by the 
consumers.  On the other hand, when we exempt small businesses from the 
VAT  or when  special treatments  of  no bookkeeping  or lower  tax  rates  are 
provided to small businesses, we take it for granted that small businesses bear 
all the tax burden, or that the VAT  is not shifted to consumers.  Needless to 
say, special treatment is provided to small businesses, not to reduce the tax 
burden but to expedite administration. 
A more or less similar argument applies to the “exemption” system of the 
VAT.  Exemption takes two forms: exemption of certain taxpayers and exemp- 
tion of certain goods and services. Small businesses are exempt from the VAT 
since the government can reduce administrative and compliance problems by 
excluding taxpayers with small turnovers. For social, political, and adminis- 
trative reasons,  exemptions are granted on basic necessities  such as unpro- 
cessed food stuffs, on hard-to-tax services such as banking and insurance, on 
social and cultural goods such as medical  service, education,  books,  news- 
papers, and on goods and services supplied by public enterprises. 
The purpose of exemption is not to reduce the VAT burden but to facilitate 
the administration of  the VAT.  Exempt supplies are outside the scope of  the 
VAT  altogether.  In contrast to the zero rate,  exempt transactions bear some 
VAT  on the value of transactions.  The reason for the exemption scheme in 
the VAT structure lies not in the reduction of regressivity but in the simplifi- 
cation of administration and compliance. The moderation of the VAT’s regres- 
sivity or improvement in the progressivity of the VAT burden can be achieved 
more effectively  through  the zero rating rather than through  the exemption 
scheme. This simple but important point has not yet caught the attention of 
the VAT policymakers in Korea and Taiwan, as well as in many other coun- 
tries. 
It is very important to emphasize why small businesses want to stay small 
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and  why  they  seldom use the  10% tax credit.  Small traders  cheat on their 
sales, not to evade the VAT but to evade personal or corporate income taxes. 
It must be emphasized that an effective VAT greatly aids income tax adminis- 
tration and that the operation of a VAT resembles that of the income tax more 
than that of other taxes. 
In this regard it is quite interesting to see that, although the data processing 
costs for the VAT increased sharply after its introduction in Taiwan, the total 
cost of  tax  administration for the VAT,  corporate income tax,  and personal 
income tax remained more or less the same as before. 
I would like to see Lin describe the rather long history of preparation lead- 
ing to the introduction of the VAT in Taiwan and elaborate on the political 
economy aspects of the VAT’s introduction. 
Lin should be congratulated for his successful efforts at elucidating the re- 
form of business tax in Taiwan. 